In advocating a temporary-flooding exception, the Government relies primarily on Sanguinetti, U. That case involved a canal constructed by the Government connecting a slough and a river. The Court held there was no taking on these facts. This outcome rested on settled principles of foreseeability and causation. Moreover, the property was subject to seasonal flooding prior to the construction of the canal, and the landowner failed to show a causal connection between the canal and the increased flooding, which may well have been occasioned by changes in weather patterns.
See id. The Government would have us extract from this statement a definitive rule that there can be no temporary taking caused by floods. That case, we note, was decided in , well before the World War II-era cases and First English, in which the Court first homed in on the matter of compensation for temporary takings. If the Court indeed meant to express a general limitation on the Takings Clause, that limitation has been superseded by subsequent developments in our jurisprudence. There is certainly no suggestion in Sanguinetti that flooding cases should be set apart from the mine run of takings claims.
The sentence in question was composed to summarize the flooding cases the Court had encountered up to that point, which had unexceptionally involved permanent, rather than temporary, government-induced flooding. See Cress, U. Lynah, U. But as just explained, no distinction between permanent and temporary flooding was material to the result in Sanguinetti. We resist reading a single sentence unnecessary to the decision as having done so much work.
If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. Virginia, 6 Wheat. The Government also asserts that the Court in Loretto interpreted Sanguinetti the same way the Federal Circuit did in this case.
That assertion bears careful inspection. But the first rule of case law as well as statutory interpretation is: Read on. There is thus no solid grounding in precedent for set- ting flooding apart from all other government intrusions on property.
Its primary argument is of the in for a penny, in for a pound genre: reversing the decision below, the Government worries, risks disruption of pub- lic works dedicated to flood control. Brief for United States To reject a categorical bar to temporary-flooding takings claims, however, is scarcely to credit all, or even many, such claims. It is of course in- cumbent on courts to weigh carefully the relevant factors and circumstances in each case, as instructed by our decisions. See infra, at The slippery slope argument, we note, is hardly novel or unique to flooding cases.
While we recognize the importance of the public interests the Government advances in this case, we do not see them as categorically different from the interests at stake in myriad other Takings Clause cases. This concession is in some tension with the categorical rule adopted by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, once it is recognized that at least some repeated nonpermanent flooding can amount to a taking of property, the question presented to us has been essentially answered.
Central Eureka Mining Co. Mahon, U. Wilkinson, U. For the same reason, we are not equipped to address the bearing, if any, of Arkansas water-rights law on this case. Lucas, U. Washington Legal Foundation, U. But Arkansas law was not examined by the Federal Circuit, and therefore is not properly pursued in this Court. See Glover v. We rule today, simply and only, that government-induced flooding temporary in duration gains no auto- matic exemption from Takings Clause inspection.
When regulation or temporary physical invasion by government interferes with private property, our decisions recognize, time is indeed a factor in determining the existence vel non of a compensable taking. See Loretto, U. See supra, at 9; John Horstmann Co.
See also Ridge Line, Inc. United States, F. Palazzolo v. For example, the Management Area lies in a floodplain below a dam, and had experienced flooding in the past. See supra, at 4—5. Severity of the interference figures in the calculus as well. Every successive trespass adds to the force of the evidence.
The Court of Federal Claims found that the flooding the Commission assails was foreseeable. Because the Federal Circuit rested its decision entirely on the temporary duration of the flooding, it did not address those challenges.
As earlier noted, see supra, at 13, preserved issues remain open for consideration on remand. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice.
Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship. B In , the Commission filed the instant lawsuit against the United States, claiming that the temporary deviations from the Manual constituted a taking of property that entitled the Commission to compensation.
IV We rule today, simply and only, that government-induced flooding temporary in duration gains no auto- matic exemption from Takings Clause inspection. It is so ordered.
The prospect of reclamation, however, does not disqualify a landowner from receipt of just compensation for a taking. Justia case law is provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements.
Also relevant to the takings inquiry is the degree to which the invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of authorized government action. For example, the Management Area lies in a floodplain below a dam, and had experienced flooding in the past. Severity of the interference figures in the calculus as well. This passage is confusing. It lists, without any differentiation, various tests that have been developed over the years to determine different types of takings.
New York City. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency , U. For over a half century, the Court has consistently held that the only relevance that the duration of the government interference has in a takings claim is in measuring how much compensation is due.
But none of the cases cited in support of that sentence compel such a drastic change in takings law. The decision eliminates a categorical defense to takings claims, and establishes principles that should fend off future categorical rules limiting government liability under the Takings Clause. The opinion, however, provides a temporary fix for the temporary takings issue because it leaves the question of how a court should review such a claim unresolved.
For more information, see www. United States, U. The Court issued its decision on Dec. United States, 87 Fed. United States, F. Green Bay Co. Petty Motor Co. General Motors Corp. Dec 4, Petition for a writ of certiorari filed.
Response due December 16, Order extending time to file response to petition to and including January 17, Brief amici curiae of National Association of Home Builders, et al. Brief amici curiae of Arkansas, et al.
Order further extending time to file response to petition to and including March 1, Brief of respondent United States in opposition filed. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from the counsel for the respondent.
The time to file the joint appendix and petitioner's brief on the merits is extended to and including June 22, The time to file respondent's brief on the merits is extended to and including August 24, The time to file the joint appendix and petitioner's brief on the merits is further extended to and including June 27, The time to file respondent's brief on the merits is further extended to and including August 27, Brief amici curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation, et al.
Brief amicus curiae of Owners' Counsel of America filed. Brief amici curiae of Washington Legal Foundation, et al. Brief of respondent United States filed. Motion for leave to file amici brief filed by professors of law teaching in the property law and water rights fields. Brief amici curiae of International Municipal Lawyers Association, et al.
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